Musicing, Materiality, and the Emotional Niche by Krueger, Joel
Action, Criticism & Theory for Music Education 
 
I S S N  1 5 4 5 – 4 5 1 7  
 
 
 
A refereed journal of the 
 
Action for Change in Music Education 
 
 
 
Volume 14  Number 3 
November 2015 
	  
 
Marie McCarthy, Guest Editor 
 
Vincent C. Bates, Editor 
 
Brent C. Talbot, Associate Editor 
 
 
 
Musicing, Materiality, and the Emotional Niche 
 
Joel Krueger 
 
 
 
 
 
© Joel Krueger.  2015.  The content of this article is the sole responsibility of the authors.  The ACT 
Journal and the Mayday Group are not liable for any legal actions that may arise involving the article's 
content, including, but not limited to, copyright infringement.   
 
Special Features: When this document is open in Adobe Reader, endnotes and citations can be viewed 
by placing the cursor over the corresponding number or date.
Action, Criticism, and Theory for Music Education 14(3)                                                    
Krueger, Joel.  2015.  Musicing, materiality, and the emotional niche.  Action, Criticism, and Theory 
for Music Education 14(3): 43–62.  act.maydaygroup.org/articles/Krueger14_3.pdf 
43 
 
 
 
Musicing, Materiality, and the Emotional Niche 
 
Joel Krueger 
University of Exeter 
 
	  
Abstract	  
Building on Elliot and Silverman’s (2015) embodied and enactive approach to 
musicing, I argue for an extended approach: namely, the idea that music can 
function as an environmental scaffolding supporting the development of various 
experiences and embodied practices that would otherwise remain inaccessible.  I 
focus especially on the materiality of music.  I argue that one of the central ways we 
use music, as a material resource, is to manipulate social space—and in so doing, 
manipulate our emotions.  Acts of musicing, thought of as processes of 
environmental space manipulation, are thus examples of what I term “emotional 
niche construction.”  I explore three dimensions of this process and appeal to 
different strands of empirical work to support this picture. 
 
Keywords: music perception, extended mind, music and emotions, emotion 
regulation, material culture, niche construction 
 
 
lliott and Silverman have produced a remarkable book in Music Matters 
(2015).  Although it claims to offer a philosophy of music education, it 
touches on nearly every important dimension of philosophy of music, 
generally construed.  I cannot engage in a similarly comprehensive discussion.  
Instead, I will consider some themes at the heart of Music Matters.  These themes 
are encapsulated in the following remark, which can be read as a mission statement 
for the book:  “[T]o understand musical understanding, we need to investigate the 
invisible embodied-enactive scaffolding, the embodied infrastructure, that underpins 
and fuels all forms of musicing and listening” (Elliott and Silverman 2015, 201).  I 
agree with Elliott and Silverman that “musicing”—their term (which I will adopt) for 
all music-related activities, solitary and social—is best understood by assuming a 
E 
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multidimensional and interdisciplinary perspective on its embodied, enactive, and 
scaffolded nature.   
I will focus especially on this last point: the idea that music can function as 
scaffolding, a persistent environmental resource supporting the development of 
various experiences and embodied practices.  In light of this focus, I will talk about 
the materiality of music.  This term is meant to emphasize two things: first, that 
music shows up for us, experientially, as something we use, something we do things 
with; second, this is because music is mediated by artifacts and environments that 
afford different uses.  And one of the central ways we use music, I will argue, is to 
actively manipulate social space—and in so doing, manipulate our emotions.  Acts of 
musicing, seen as processes of environmental space manipulation, might thus be 
thought of as examples of what I will call “emotional niche construction.”  The 
materiality of music is what makes these practices possible.   
None of what I say below is inconsistent with Elliott and Silverman’s views.  In 
fact, I see my claims as congruent with their analysis.  I simply hope to enrich their 
already wide-ranging discussion by introducing some additional concepts to help 
bring aspects of these “invisible” dimensions of musicing into sharper relief.    
  
The Space of Musicing 
The dimension of musicing I am concerned with is music listening.  It is tempting to 
think of music listening as a passive affair.  Whether stopping to listen to street 
performers, reclining into a plush velvet seat while taking in a symphony orchestra, 
or streaming music at home while preparing dinner, it’s not immediately clear that 
these episodes involve much music-directed activity or environmental 
manipulation—beyond, perhaps, pressing buttons on our listening device.  There is a 
musical event happening, one might say, but as listeners we simply absorb this 
event.  However, as Elliott and Silverman convincingly argue, this passive 
characterization of musicing is misleading.  For, even seemingly passive cases of 
musicing—such as playing music softly in the background while making dinner—still 
involve a deliberate use of music.  We actively manipulate various features of the 
music and listening context: the genre, order of the tracks, volume, length of our 
listening episode, how closely we attend, which device we use to listen, where we 
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position it, and so on.  Musicing-in-listening is thus an active process.  We use music 
as a resource for manipulating our environment and ourselves.   
This manipulative dimension of musicing becomes even clearer when we focus on 
the world-making power of music.  At one level of description, music is nothing but 
vibrations moving through air.  But this description has no traction at the 
phenomenological level.  When we perceive music qua music, we perceive it as 
meaningful—that is, as exhibiting an organized structure, a phenomenologically rich 
sounding environment (Reybrouck 2015; see also Clarke 2005, Krueger 2009).  As 
Elliott and Silverman put it, we become “engaged with the musical world we’re 
creating with our musical, bodily-perceptual “knowing hows”” (Elliott and Silverman 
2015, 206).  One of the reasons this is possible is because, phenomenologically, 
music bears spatial content—and our perceptual encounter with music involves the 
experience of action-soliciting musical space.  Phenomenologically, we encounter 
music as a spatially-structured soundworld comprised of qualities that beckon for 
further exploration and bodily engagement (e.g., attentive focus, rhythmic 
entrainment, etc.).1   
This is apparent in the way we routinely invoke spatial notions to describe music.  
It is very difficult to describe music without invoking spatial notions.  When talking 
about pitch organization, for example—a feature which, in contrast to other elements 
such as timbre, texture, or tempo, is unique to music—we rely upon spatial contrasts 
such as “up and down”, “high and low”, “small and large”, and so on (Morgan 1980).  
This is also the case when talking about our emotional responses to music.  For 
example, Peltola and Saresma (2014) found that listeners commonly use spatial and 
movement metaphors when asked to describe their experience of listening to sad 
music. 
Another line of support comes from studies of amusia, a severe deficiency in 
processing pitch variation despite normal speech perception and intact sense of 
rhythm (Ayotte et al. 2002; Peretz et al. 2002).  For the total amusiac, music is 
experienced as unstructured noise; it sounds like a screeching car or banging bots 
and pans (McDonald and Stewart 2008; Sacks 2007).  But amusia is more than a 
sensory-musical deficit.  There is evidence it is also a spatial deficit—an inability to 
represent space (Särkämö et al 2009).2 For example, people with amusia perform 
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significantly worse than non-amusiac controls on mental rotation tasks (Douglas and 
Bilkey 2007; see also Cupchik et al. 2001).  They also have difficulty synchronizing 
bodily movements with rhythmic elements and pitch variations in music despite 
normal ability to synchronize with non-musical sounds (Dalla Bella and Peretz 2003; 
Foxton et al. 2006).   
Phenomenologically, amusiacs lack the ability to perceive music as a spatially-
structured soundworld.  Amusiacs can still perceive music’s locational space; they 
can point to music as an irritating sound sequence coming from over there, for 
example.  However, they cannot experience the inner space of the musical piece: the 
syntactical structure of the music established by the way its elements (tones, melody, 
rhythmic progressions, textures, etc.) hang together, lending the piece its coherence 
as a composed object.3 Perceiving this inner space of music is what makes music 
show up as meaningful.   
It thus seems that music perception involves spatial content.4 For most of us, the 
spatial content of music means that it shows up as a richly-structured soundworld 
inviting further exploration; it is phenomenologically manifest, in other words, as a 
sounding environment that draws us toward and into itself, presenting a topography 
of sounds, textures, and rhythmic elements to attentively unpack, explore, and 
manipulate. 
 
Musical Manipulations and the Emotional Niche 
These considerations affirm Elliott and Silverman’s portrayal of music listening as a 
dynamic, exploratory process.  In virtue of its spatiality, music is an environmental 
resource listeners can bring into use.  And one of these uses, Elliott and Silverman 
note, is to “actively construct their emotional lives by deliberately making and 
listening to specific kinds of music, at specific times, and specific places in their lives” 
(Elliott and Silverman 2015, 308).  In other words, music is material for constructing 
an emotional niche: a soundworld deliberately used to modify, regulate, and sustain 
(i.e., scaffold) particular emotional episodes.  How does this process occur?   
I now want to expand Elliott and Silverman’s claim and consider three 
dimensions of this question.  Constructing a musically scaffolded emotional niche, I 
suggest, consists in the manipulation of (1) soundworlds deliberately engineered (2) 
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to provide self-stimulating feedback (3) affecting functional gain.  Collectively, these 
three dimensions help clarify how music, as material resource, is brought into use in 
the service of emotional action and experience.     
    
Musical engineering 
As we saw previously, music has an inherently spatial character.  The spatial content 
of music is one of the features that specifies the musical event as meaningful.  But 
music is a flexible resource that can also fit into—and in so doing, reconfigure—pre-
existing spaces, too.   
For example, we play background music to shape the atmosphere of gatherings 
such as a dinner party, athletic event, or meditation session.  The music need not 
dominate; its materiality means that it can be selectively positioned.  At a formal 
dinner, for example, music can be deliberately played at a low volume and allowed to 
supplement the proceedings, providing unobtrusive background color.  Alternatively, 
if a sedate dinner party is interrupted by up-tempo pop music blasting from speakers 
in the next room, guests might respond by getting up, moving to a new space, and 
dancing.  The music in this way reconfigures the space of that environment by 
introducing novel sonic elements as well as novel action possibilities.  Music is 
selectively used to manage the organizational dynamics of different environments—
including an environment’s practical and normative space, as the dinner party 
example demonstrates.5 As Clarke observes, this spatial manipulation is possible 
because “music is inextricably bound up with that wider auditory world, since it 
sounds within it, incorporates environmental sounds into its own material, and (with 
the development of recording, broadcast and listening technologies) takes on fluid 
relationships with the physical and social spaces that it occupies—from practical and 
normative to provocative and paradoxical” (Clarke 2013, 90).     
But music can be employed in a more intimate and emotionally salient way.  
Music is mediated by material culture, including instruments, environments, 
listening technologies, and people.  This means that, as Elliott and Silverman put it, 
music is a product; it is something created and consumed in private and public 
contexts (Elliott and Silverman 2015, 282–305).  Technological advances have 
rendered music more portable—and thus personalizable—than ever before.  Thanks 
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to the development of the MP3 format and cheap, ultra-portable digital music 
players—along with streaming services that push music through mobile phones, 
tablets, and computers—music is now ubiquitous.  We construct musical 
soundworlds anywhere and at any time with the push of a button or tap of a 
touchscreen. 
Crucially for our purposes, these portable soundworlds are self-styled 
environments.  We selectively engineer them to accommodate emotional 
requirements in real-time: we create playlists, juxtaposing artists, genres, and 
individual tracks in nearly limitless combinations.  Alternatively, we can offload 
some of the decision process onto the technology.  Streaming services provide 
personalized soundtracks based on the time of day, our desired mood or activity, 
previous listening habits, genre likes and dislikes, and so forth.  The technology 
adapts to our interactions and adjusts itself accordingly.  And the musical content we 
now have access to via these services is immense: vast libraries, from famous 
classical pieces to indigenous music or obscure Finnish Black Metal.  The materiality 
of modern musicing affords unprecedented control over what we listen to, when we 
listen to it, and how we listen to it.   
Our portable soundworlds have a direct impact on our emotional engagement 
with the wider auditory and social environment.  For example, we use them to 
emotionally detach from the environment (DeNora 2013).  By using headphones and 
playing our music loudly, we occlude hostile or unpleasant features of our situation.  
A noisy subway ride full of raucous passengers becomes tolerable when it fades to the 
background as we immerse ourselves in a favorite musical soundworld.  
Alternatively, we can use music to reframe that situation and open up possibilities for 
reengagement.  While listening to a soothing tune, for instance, the people around 
us, once the source of irritating conversation, might now be experienced in a new 
light: as fellow travelers simply getting on with their business.  We can also 
reconfigure the social and normative space of that environment by introducing the 
music as a public resource.  Playing music so that others hear it might solicit 
conversation and connection—or irritation if they find it disruptive or unpleasant. 
The point of these observations is that, as a material resource, we routinely use 
music to personalize the public spaces we move through, as well as the way we 
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emotionally engage with these spaces.  We do so on micro (e.g., solitary experiences, 
such as listening with headphones) and macro (e.g., playing music at a dinner party 
or political rally) levels.  Our portable musical soundworlds are thus powerful 
examples of engineered niches, nested within the wider socio-cultural and acoustic 
spaces of a common world.     
     
Musical feedback 
In addition to its power to manipulate space, another reason music functions 
effectively as a tool for emotional niche construction is because it is a persistent 
source of bio-regulatory feedback.  By selectively engineering our environments with 
music, it becomes part of a self-stimulating feedback loop that drives, structures, and 
regulates the character and development of various embodied processes responsible 
for emotional action and experience.6 
To get a firmer grip on the dynamics of this process, it may be helpful to first 
consider how gestures and facial expressions play a similar self-stimulating role.  A 
common deflationary view of gestures sees them as expressing fully formed thoughts; 
gestures function as fleshy props, this line of thinking goes, helpful for 
communicating the meaning of thoughts and intentions but in no way essential to 
mental phenomena they communicate.  However, from the perspective of embodied 
and extended cognition (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Menary 2010), gestures play 
a more significant role in the economy of cognition in that “the gesture, the actual 
motion of the gesture itself, is a dimension of thinking” (McNeill 2005, 98).  
Gestures may even provide material resources that grant access to otherwise-
inaccessible forms thought (Clark 2013; Goldin-Meadow 2003).   
There is evidence, for example, that inhibiting gesture during mathematical and 
memory tests significantly reduces overall performance (Goldin-Meadow et al. 2001; 
Wagner et al 2004).  Instead of working through difficult problems exclusively in our 
head, gestures provide an expanded set of representational formats driving the 
process along.  We offload certain computations onto the visuospatial dynamics of 
gestures; we use them to redundantly reflect verbal information or “augment that 
information, adding nuances possibly only through visual or motor formats” 
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(Golding-Meadow 2003, 186).  This offloading frees up internal resources for other 
tasks and prompts real-time recognition of new problem-solving possibilities.   
Gestures and facial expressions seem to play a similar self-stimulating role in the 
realm of emotions.  There is abundant evidence that afferent feedback from muscles 
and skin when making emotion-specific facial expressions (smiling, frowning, etc.) 
shapes the qualitative intensity of the emotion (see Laird 2007, and Niedenthal 2007 
for overviews).  Simply making a facial expression is sufficient to bring about the 
associated experience; once present, further expressions modulate its ongoing 
development and felt character (Adelmann and Zajonc 1989).  Other support comes 
from deficit studies.  When this embodied feedback is missing—in the case of 
congenital facial paralysis, for example (Cole 1997), or in individuals who have 
voluntarily received muscle-inhibiting Botox injections (Davis et al. 2010)—the 
phenomenology of the emotion is significantly diminished (Krueger 2012, 157-60).  
As with gestures and cognition, the expression appears to be a material dimension of 
the experience.  Without it, we cannot access the experience, at least in its full 
qualitative intensity.      
So how might music play an analogous self-stimulating role? Music is an ultra-
portable resource we carry with us and use to construct on-demand soundworlds.  As 
such, like gestures and facial expressions, it is a persistent material feature of our 
expressive repertoire.  And by stimulating and directly modulating emotion-specific 
neural and physiological responses, music functions as a real-time emotion 
regulator, coaxing emotions out of us and shaping their dynamics as they unfold in 
real time.        
There is a great deal of empirical evidence to support this picture.  As already 
discussed—and as Elliott and Silverman amply demonstrate—music listening is a 
richly multimodal, active experience (Janata et al. 2012; Witek et al. 2014).  Even 
seemingly passive listening episodes involve brain activity in the supplementary 
motor area, mid-premotor cortex, and cerebellum (Chen et al. 2008).  The motor 
system is central to processing musical rhythms (see, e.g., Sakai et al. 1999; Grahn 
and Brett 2007; Kohler et al. 2002); other studies suggest that the experience of 
agency and bodily movement plays a crucial role in shaping how music shows up for 
the listener (e.g., Phillips-Silver and Trainor 2005).  There is a sense in which we 
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literally hear music through movement; we perceptually approach music as 
something that affords motor potentialities.  These potentialities frame our 
experience of music as a resource that can be brought into use.7 
But music also pulls motor and neurophysiological responses out of us that 
directly modulate our emotional experience and action (Burger et al. 2013).  Studies 
using facial electromyography (EMG) found that listeners exhibit spontaneous facial 
expressions mimicking the expressive character of the music (e.g., smiling in 
response to upbeat music, frowning in response to sad music), including non-vocal 
music (Chan et al. 2013; Lundqvist 2009; Witvliet and Vrana 1996).  As noted above, 
these overt physical expressions elicit the associated emotional experience (Laird 
2007; Niedenthal 2007).  Music also exerts a direct modulatory impact on other 
components of the emotional response system (Bartlett 1996; Lundqvist et al 2009; 
see Scherer and Zentner 2001 for an overview).  When we listen to music judged to 
be happy, sad, or fearful, for example, an array of physiological responses unfold that 
are very similar to responses that occur when we experience these emotions in non-
musical contexts (Krumhansl 1997).  Nyklicek et al (1997) found evidence of 
cardiorespiratory differentiation of musically induced emotions (happy, sad, serene, 
agitated, etc.).  And as far as the brain is concerned, music perception and emotional 
responsiveness are integrated processes.  Various neuroimaging studies indicate that 
our emotional responses to music recruit core brain structures involved in initiating, 
generating, detecting, maintaining, and regulating emotions (Koelsch 2010; see also 
Blood et al. 1999; Koelsch 2014; Overy and Molnar-Szakacs 2009).    
These studies (and many more like them) present an emerging picture of music as 
a potent resource for driving, organizing, and sustaining emotional experience and 
behavior.  We play music—we selectively engineer a self-styled soundworld—and 
then by temporarily inhabiting this soundworld let music take over some of the bio-
regulatory work on our behalf.  In taking over this regulatory role, music functions 
much the way that input from a skilled dance partner extends, transforms—and in an 
important sense, completes—the shape of our own responses.  In fact, our 
engagements with music are, in many ways, perceptual dances.  They are reciprocal 
interactions constituted by the sensorimotor dynamics of how we both approach the 
music as well as how the music, in turn, approaches and engages with us (Windsor 
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and de Bézenac 2012).  Musical feedback thus scaffolds emotional action and 
experience.  Its dynamic qualities (periodic modulations of melody, rhythm, volume, 
intensity, etc.) and temporal character make it well suited for this task.  Elliott and 
Silverman put this last point well when they write that music listening “is 
experiential in the full-blooded sense of phenomenological couplings between our 
entire beings (not just our brains) and the meaning-making opportunities or 
“affordances” of pieces of music that flow in time and across time” (Elliott and 
Silverman 2015, 205).   
 
Musically driven functional gain 
So far, I’ve considered the materiality of music and its role in constructing an 
emotional niche.  I’ve argued that music is something brought into use—a material 
resource that can be selectively manipulated in various user-specific ways.  These 
manipulations, I’ve argued further, are important in this context because they exert a 
downstream modulatory impact on the listener’s ongoing patterns of emotional 
action and experience.  In manipulating music, we simultaneously manipulate not 
only the environment but ourselves.  The music we manipulate loops back onto us 
and, as active and responsive listeners, shapes our further manipulations and 
embodied responses.  Something like this is what Elliott and Silverman seem to have 
in mind when they speak of “phenomenological couplings” between music and 
listener. 
But there is still a third dimension to this process that helps explain why we are 
driven to enact these music listener “phenomenological couplings”.  Simply put, 
when we “couple” with music, we access emotional capacities and experiences that, 
without the music’s ongoing input, remain otherwise inaccessible—again, much like a 
novice dancer can only perform advanced moves with a skilled partner.  To borrow a 
term of art from cognitive science: as musically coupled listeners we realize 
functional gain.8  
Once more, there are various lines of empirical evidence to support this picture.  
From birth, we are motivated to enact musical couplings (Adachi and Trehub 2012; 
Dissanayake 2013; Zentner and Eerola 2010).  Newborns recall musical stimuli 
perceived during their fetal period (e.g., their mother singing “Twinkle, Twinkle, 
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Little Star”) (Partanen et al 2013) and, after birth, actively seek out music.  They 
appear to recognize it as a resource that can be brought into use.  For example, 
infants perceptually discriminate musical from non-musical sounds, coordinating 
their responsive behavior with the former but not the latter (Trainor and Heinmiller 
1998; Zentner and Kagan 1998; Nawrot 2003).  Even very young infants, including 
preterm infants, appear to experience music as a resource affording bodily 
engagement.  They entrain various embodied responses—respiratory patterns, 
sucking (both rhythm and intensity), tongue and mouth protrusion, eye opening and 
closing, vocalizations, etc.—with rhythmic and melodic patterns in lullabies and 
consonant music (Haslbeck 2014; Teckenberg-Jansson et al. 2011).   
Within these early episodes of musicing, infants realize functional gain.  This is 
clear when we consider that, for the first months of life, infants lack endogenous 
resources to self-regulate attention and emotion (Posner and Rothbart 1998).  What 
they attend to and experience is largely determined by what is going on around them.  
Accordingly, in noisy or disruptive environments—such as the neonate intensive care 
unit (NICU), where young infants are confined to incubators, devoid of touch, and 
continually surrounded by beeping and whirring machines, bottles clanking, voices 
of nurses and doctors rushing to and fro, or the crying of other babies—infants are 
often in a chronically distressed state, both physiologically and behaviorally.     
This changes when they become phenomenologically coupled with music.  For 
example, when a caregiver sings lullabies while stroking the infant or plays gentle 
music with a simple, predictable structure, the infant realizes an elevated bio-
regulatory competence.  The music functions as a stabilizing environment, 
“modulating the array of physiological states and micro-behaviors associated with 
instability into an array associated with stability—stable heart rate, blood pressure, 
colour, feeding, changes in posture, muscle tone, less frantic movements, rhythmic 
crying, cessation of grimacing, and an ability to sleep or become animated and 
intent” (DeNora 2000, 81).  By latching onto the music as it unfolds in time, 
musically scaffolded infants realize cognitive and emotional capacities that, outside 
of this transient soundworld, remain otherwise inaccessible.   
What about mature perceivers? One important dimension of this functional gain 
is access to an expanded phenomenological repertoire.  In using music as a resource 
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to construct our emotions in real-time, we gain access to an enriched palate of 
expressive capacities lifting us beyond our normal modes of experience and 
expression.   
Again, DeNora’s work is instructive, particularly her analysis of music as an on-
demand resource for emotional “venting”, as she terms it.  One woman DeNora 
interviewed says that listening to specifically chosen tracks while sad is like “looking 
at yourself in a mirror being sad” (DeNora 2000, 57).  The music provides self-
stimulating resources enabling the woman to articulate and explore her sadness in a 
new way, she says, guiding her into a qualitatively deepened state before leading her 
out of it (DeNora 2000, 57).  Another woman reports using music as a tool for 
working through her grief upon losing a young child: “The Verdi Requiem is one of 
my favorites.  That is associated with losing a baby.  And I’d got to know it through 
my husband and it was really quite a way of grieving—I’d shut myself in my room 
[she begins to cry]… It’s cathartic, I think” (DeNora 2000, 58).  Reports of using 
music to construct and explore emotions this way are not uncommon.  As DeNora 
puts it—in language similar to Elliott and Silverman—venting with music is to use 
music “as a virtual means of expressing or constructing emotion … to define the 
temporal and qualitative structure of that emotion, to play it out in real time and 
then move on” (DeNora 2000, 58).   
These musical-emotional constructions are possible, I suggest, because music 
possesses expressive qualities that are more agile, evocative, and nuanced than are 
their behavioral counterparts (e.g., gestures, facial expressions, etc.).  In contrast to a 
facial expression or gesture, say, musical expressions possess increased complexity, 
temporal range, subtlety, and force (Cochrane 2008, 338).  When we construct and 
inhabit our self-styled soundworlds, we thus (temporarily) gain access to these 
expressive capacities—and music functions as a pathway scaffolding access to new 
forms of experience and expression.  In sum, we bring music into use in constructing 
a musically scaffolded emotional niche.     
 
Conclusion 
As I said at the outset, nothing I’ve discussed, as far as I can tell, goes against the 
general orientation Elliott and Silverman adopt in Music Matters.  Rather, I’ve 
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simply tried to bring out some additional themes that supplement their rich 
embodied and situated approach to musicing.  However, if the previous analysis is on 
the right track, it seems that there are additional conceptual resources in the 4E 
approach to cognition (i.e., cognition as embodied, embedded, enactive, and 
extended) that Elliott and Silverman might find theoretically fruitful.  A growing 
number of researchers in philosophy of mind and cognitive science defend some 
version of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) (Clark and Chalmers 1998; 
see also Hurley 1998; Menary 2010; Rowlands 2010).  According to HEC, some 
cognitive processes extend across brain, body and world.  Environmental resources—
when coupled with neuronal and bodily processes in the right sort of way—become 
constitutive parts of the associated cognitive process and, in so doing, open up access 
to otherwise-inaccessible forms of cognition and intelligent behavior.   
Although discussions of HEC have generated much debate, few working in this 
area have discussed emotions—and even fewer aesthetic experiences.9 But this is a 
serious omission.  Emotions and artistic practices are fundamental dimensions of 
human experience.  As Elliott and Silverman so convincingly demonstrate, 
musicing—in all its variegated forms—is an embodied practice thoroughly 
interwoven into nearly every facet of everyday life.  As I’ve tried to argue above, there 
are compelling reasons to think of music listening as a practice that is not just 
embodied and situated but also environmentally extended.  Elliott and Silverman’s 
analysis is well placed to make an important contribution to this emerging approach.  
I therefore encourage them to explicitly embrace the final “E” and turn their 
considerable resources to an analysis of the musically extended mind. 
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Notes 
1 This appears to be the case from birth—and probably even earlier.  See Krueger 
(2013).   
 
2 Although there is some debate about this claim.  See Tillmann et al (2010). 
 
3 See Clarke (2013) and Krueger (2011) for further discussion of the spatial content of 
music perception. 
 
4 There is also evidence that the intensity of our emotional responsiveness to music is 
correlated with the feeling of being spatially immersed within the music (Vastfjall 
2003). 
 
5 There is also an important political dimension to the way that music can create and 
reconstruct social-spatial boundaries.  See, for example, Smith (1997) on the role of 
jazz and rap in post-civil rights Black American culture and Cusick (2013) on music 
as an instrument of detention and torture.    
 
6 See Krueger (2014a, 2014b) for a more in-depth discussion of this idea. 
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7 Again, the experience of these motor potentialities is what seems to be missing from 
the amusiac’s experience—hence their anomalous musical phenomenology. 
 
8 See Wilson (2010); see also Krueger (2014b). 
 
9 There are some recent exceptions.  See, for example, Colombetti and Roberts 
(2015), Krueger (2014c), Slaby (2014), Stephan et al (2014), and the essays in 
Manzotti (2011). 
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